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Rethinking Reexamination Reform: 
Is It Time for Corrective Surgery, or Is 
It Time to Amputate? 
Kristen Jakobsen Osenga * 
INTRODUCTION 
Patent law promotes technological change. Patents award a 
limited monopoly to an inventor for his or her useful, nonobvious 
invention-as well as for the time, energy, and money invested in 
its creation. When that activity results in a useful invention, a 
patent encourages further innovation as manufacturers and others 
invest time, energy, and money into producing the invention on a 
large scale and refining it for the consumer market. As they 
proceed, manufacturers can remain secure in the knowledge that a 
late-coming competitor cannot simply replicate their innovation 
and enter the market quickly and cheaply. In addition to inducing 
these productive behaviors, patents also disclose new technology 
to the public. This disclosure advances scientific progress and puts 
the world on notice by clearly defining boundaries around which 
competitors must design. As a result, efficiency flourishes. 
Due to the important roles that patents play in society, the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") is motivated only to issue 
valid patents. Invalid patents create problems including 
unnecessary duplicative research efforts, instability in business 
investing, and a decreasing number of technological advances 
made available to the public. Since courts defer to the expertise of 
J.D., magna cum laude, University of Illinois College of Law; M.S., Southern Illinois 
University; B.S.E., University of Iowa. The author is currently a law clerk to the 
Honorable Richard Linn of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. She wishes 
to thank Jay Kesan for his guidance and comments on early drafts of this Article. The 
views expressed herein are solely those of the author. 
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the PTO, patents enjoy a presumption of validity in any lawsuit for 
infringement. For all of these reasons, inventors, investors, the 
public, and the judiciary must truly believe in the validity of 
patents. 
In this time of rapid technological change, sources of 
knowledge have become increasingly decentralized. As a result, 
the PTO might approve a patent application and issue a patent, 
unaware of existing information that would render the patent 
invalid. Responding to this concern in an effort to improve 
confidence in the patent system, Congress enacted the first 
reexamination laws over twenty years ago to provide a mechanism 
to cure wrongfully issued patents. Since that time, it is doubtful 
Congress's hopes have been realized. 
Reexamination was introduced as a mechanism for curing 
potentially invalid patents, as an antidote to the public's and the 
judiciary's lack of confidence in the PTO and the patent system in 
general. Instead of a curative fix, however, the reexamination 
provisions are more akin to a diseased or lame leg on the body of 
U.S. patent law. Reexamination fails to support the burden of 
public confidence it was intended to carry. It does not act in 
harmony with other limbs on the body of patent law or with other 
bodies of U.S. or foreign law. Over the years, Congress has 
repeatedly introduced legislation to perform corrective surgery by 
adding to or cosmetically altering the existing reexamination laws. 
Instead of merely seeking to correct the existing problem, a more 
sound course of treatment would be to amputate the current 
reexamination proceedings in total. Congress could then provide a 
prosthetic leg-an invalidation procedure that does not look 
anything like the old limb but provides the same function. Such a 
procedure may be awkward at first but will eventually become 
natural. This Article explores the necessity of amputation and 
proposes a workable, realistic prosthetic invalidation procedure. 
Part I will describe the history of patent reform legislation 
leading up to the passage of the original reexamination 
proceedings and continuing through Congress's most recent 
attempt to correct some major reexamination deficiencies via the 
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 ("AlP A"). Part II will 
discuss and compare the original reexamination provisions, now 
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known as "ex parte reexamination," and the new provisions added 
in 1999, known as "inter partes reexamination." Further, recent 
legislation to refine both reexamination provisions will be 
described. Part III will evaluate the shortcomings of both the ex 
parte and inter partes reexamination proceedings in light of 
theories and objectives of patent law. Part IV will consist of a 
comparative analysis of reexamination proceedings in the United 
States with the revocation and opposition proceedings that exist in 
Europe and Japan. Finally, Part V proposes a realistic 
recommendation that addresses these issues and considers 
justifications for this proposed system. 
I. CURING THE SPECTER OF INVALID PATENTS 
A. Patents and Invalidity1 
Patents are granted for applications describing eligible subject 
matter that meet three threshold requirements of patentability and 
contain an adequate disclosure of the invention. Eligible subject 
matter includes "new and useful process[es], machine[s], 
manufacture[s], or composition[s] of matter."2 Court decisions 
have clarified this to include "anything under the sun ... made by 
man"3 and exclude only "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas."4 Once the subject matter is deemed eligible, the 
invention is then examined to determine if the gateway 
requirements of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness have been 
met. 5 The threshold of the utility requirement is quite low and 
only requires that the invention confer some identifiable benefit.6 
The novelty requirement comprises two prongs: (1) the invention 
The following discussion about basic patent law is not comprehensive and serves 
only to provide a background for the remainder of this Article. 
2 35 u.s.c. § 101 (2000). 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 n.6 (1980). 
!d. at 309. 
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03. 
See Envirotech Corp. v. AI George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 762 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[T]he 
fact that an invention has only limited utility and is only operable in certain applications 
is not grounds for finding lack of utility."); cf 35 U.S.C. § 101 (allowing patents to be 
issued for "any new and useful process" or "any new and useful improvement"). 
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must not be anticipated, (2) nor may it be statutorily barred. 7 To 
avoid anticipation, the invention must not have been described in 
another reference prior to invention by the applicant.8 Further, if 
the invention was described, publicly used, or offered for sale more 
than one year prior to the date the patent application was filed, the 
applicant is statutorily barred from obtaining a patent.9 To be 
deemed nonobvious, the invention must not be an obvious 
combination of prior inventions. 1° Finally, the application must 
sufficiently disclose the invention by providing enough detail to 
allow a person "ordinarily skilled in the art" to practice the 
invention without undue experimentation, as well as provide the 
best mode as it is known to the inventor. 11 Once the examiner is 
satisfied that the application meets the criteria, the patent is 
granted. 
A granted patent gives the inventor (or more likely, the 
inventor's assignee) the right to exclude others from making, 
using, or selling the invention for twenty years from the date that 
the patent application was filed. 12 In essence, a patent creates a 
limited, legal monopoly. While monopolies are generally 
disfavored as being against public policy, many economic and 
philosophical justifications have been raised to support patent 
protection. 13 
See 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
See 35 U.S.C. § I 02{a). In the case of anticipation, the inventor may be able to prove 
invention prior to the date of the reference. See id. § 102(g). The purpose of this 
provision is to ensure that the true inventor receives the patent. 
9 See 35 U.S.C. § 102{b). The prior description in this provision must be in a printed 
publication. See id. If statutorily barred, the inventor is not permitted to prove prior 
invention. The purpose of this provision is to urge inventors to not sit on their rights. See, 
e.g., LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 107I 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). 
10 See 35 U.S.C. § 103; see, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 25-27 (1966) 
(finding that the invention in question was not nonobvious because all of its elements 
were also found in a previous invention, and the different arrangement of those elements 
made no difference because "the mechanical operation [was] identical"). 
11 See 35 U.S.C. § 112; see, e.g., White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, 
Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 790 (1983). 
12 See 35 U.S.C. § 271; 35 U.S.C. § 154{a)(2) (2003). 
13 Economic rationales advanced in support of the patent monopoly include incentive to 
create, incentive to innovate, incentive to disclose, and incentive to design around. For 
more information about economic justifications, see generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
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Since before the mid-twentieth century, the patent system faced 
hostility and skepticism from the federal judiciary, in part due to 
the general antagonism toward monopolies. 14 Judges, unlike 
patent scholars who view the patent system through economic and 
philosophic rationales, were not entirely swayed by the 
justifications advanced in favor of the limited monopolies. 15 
Further compounding the problem, the judiciary also had "a 
fundamental lack of trust in the competency of the PT0."16 For 
example, in Jungerson v. Otsby & Barton Co., Justice Jackson 
noted in his dissent that "[i]t would not be difficult to cite many 
instances of patents that have been granted, improperly ... without 
adequate tests of invention" by the PT0. 17 This observation, 
combined with judicial hostility, led Jackson to further conclude 
that "the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not 
been able to get its hands on."18 Even the statutory presumption of 
validity, 19 codified in the 1952 Patent Act, did little to shield patent 
owners from judicial animosity.Z0 It was this specter of patent 
invalidity in the eyes of the judiciary that led to the enactment of 
the first reexamination laws.21 
B. A Brief History of the Original Reexamination Provisions 
Coming on the heels of the disapproval of patent monopolies 
and the misgivings about PTO competence that colored the first 
half of the twentieth century, the arrival of the duty of candor and 
Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1017 (1989). Philosophical rationales include Locke's labor dessert theory and 
the Hegellian personhood theory. For more details, see generally Justin Hughes, The 
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988). 
14 See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent lnv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 667 (1944) 
(characterizing patents as anti-competitive monopolies); Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. 
Supermarket Equip., 340 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1950). 
15 See Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative 
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, II HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 9 (1997). 
16 Jd. 
17 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
18 Jd. (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
19 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) ("A patent shall be presumed valid."). 
20 See Janis, supra note 15, at II. 
21 Cf id. at 12-15 (highlighting the reform proposals set forth in response to judicial 
hostility, including proposals for reexamination). 
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the inequitable conduct allegation in the early 1970s intensified the 
negative spotlight on patent validity.Z2 With this in mind, a 
committee from the American Bar Association ("ABA") began 
formulating a proposal for post-issuance reexamination in 1974.23 
From 1974 to 1980, several different bills concerning 
reexamination were introduced in the federal legislature.24 Many 
of these bills were omnibus patent reform bills that sought to enact 
massive overhauls of the U.S. patent system, with reexamination 
being merely one portion therein.25 A number of the proposals 
included a reexamination proceeding that looked very similar to 
opposition proceedings that exist in other countries.26 Some 
proposals even contained provisions that resembled miniature 
trials.27 
While these bills failed in Congress, the former PTO 
commissioner, C. Marshall Dann, sought to create a procedure 
within his powers, utilizing the reexamination concept.28 In 
January 1977, Dann issued an order, popularly known as the 
"Dann amendments." The order granted a patentee the right to file 
a reissue application to permit examination based on additional 
prior art and broadened public participation by allowing protests 
based on inequitable conduct and fraud.Z9 While the judiciary 
22 See Donald Quigg, Post-Issuance Re-Examination: An Inventive Attempt at Reform, 
NAT'L L.J., June I, 1981, at 31. The allegation of '"fraud on the patent office' became an 
almost automatic pleading," raising the costs of litigation and casting an unflattering light 
on the patent bar. !d. 
23 See id. The American Bar Association ("ABA") proposal called for reexamination 
based on prior art, and included a filing fee that was high enough to cover the U.S. Patent 
Trademark Office's ("PTO") expenses for this second examination. See id. 
Foreshadowing things to come, the ABA proposal received endorsement from President 
Jimmy Carter's 1978 Committee on Industrial Innovation. See id. 
24 See N. Thane Bauz, Reanimating U.S. Patent Reexamination: Recommendations for 
Change Based upon a Comparative Study of German Law, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 945, 
947 (1994). 
25 See id. 
26 See Janis, supra note 15, at 16. 
27 See Quigg, supra note 22, at 31. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. It should be noted that two other avenues exist for third parties who become 
aware of the substance of a pending application and who have information critical to 
patentability-protest and public use proceedings. See Janis, supra note 15, at 16. 
If a third party becomes aware of the substance of a pending application and knows of 
prior art relevant to patentability, he or she may file a protest based on that prior art, 
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readily accepted this practice, causing the validity of patents to be 
strengthened in court, the Dann amendments turned the PTO into a 
small-scale courthouse.30 The Dann amendments were finally 
abolished in 1982 when it was determined that the new 
reexamination procedure would make this process duplicative.31 
Congress passed a bill in December 1980 incorporating the 
ABA concept and framework for reexamination. 32 On the floor of 
the House, Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D-Wis.) described 
the reexamination proposal as "an effort to reverse the current 
decline in U.S. productivity by strengthening the patent ... 
system[] to improve investor confidence in new technology."33 
Later, the Federal Circuit reiterated in Pat/ex Corp. v. 
Mossinghoff 4 that the main goal of the reexamination statute when 
enacted was to "cure defects in administrative agency action with 
regard to particular patents and to remedy perceived shortcomings 
in the system by which patents are issued."35 
identifying the application and listing relevant patents and publications, as well as the 
relevance of each. See Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 1.291 (2003). The 
protest, however, must be filed prior to the publication of the application. See id. The 
role of the third party "ends with the filing of the protest," and the third party learns 
nothing of the outcome until the patent issues. Jd. Protests are rarely filed. See Janis, 
supra note 15, at 16. 
Public use proceedings are equally rare. See id. A third party who becomes aware of 
a patent application may file a petition informing the PTO of public use or on-sale 
activity occurring more than one year before the filing date of the application. See Rules 
of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 1.292 (2003). If the commissioner determines 
that the petition raises a reasonable question of statutory bar, he or she may designate an 
"appropriate official" to take testimony. ld.; see also MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 720.04 (8th ed. 2001) [hereinafter MPEP]. Upon completion of the 
testimony, the examiner issues a non-reviewable decision. See id. § 720.03. 
30 See Quigg, supra note 22, at 31. Experienced examiners were pulled from already 
poorly-manned examining groups to handle these protests, leading to general inefficiency 
throughout the PTO. See id. Parties were often tied up in the PTO for an extended period 
of time, sometimes spending upwards of $100,000 for a process that was supposed to be 
quick and economical. See id. 
31 See Janis, supra note 15, at 19. 
32 See Quigg, supra note 22, at 31-32. 
33 126 CONG. REc. 29,895 (1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). 
34 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
35 ld. at 603. 
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C. Legislative Reform of the Reexamination Provisions 
Since the enactment of the reexamination proceedings in 1981, 
concerns emerged as to the statute's success in meeting the 
curative goal enunciated above. In fact, as early as 1981 
commentators and scholars raised doubts about the success of 
reexamination.36 Further, an additional goal for reexamination 
proceedings materialized in the interim-the reduction of patent 
litigation.37 These concerns resulted in another flurry of proposed 
legislation. 
Reexamination reform legislation was introduced every year 
from 1994 to 1997.38 Notably, in 1997 an omnibus patent reform 
bill, House Bill 400, was introduced that addressed several key 
concerns in patent law.39 House Bill 400 passed in April 1997 
after surviving comprehensive hearings and amendments in the 
Subcommittee on the Courts and Intellectual Property, which is a 
subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary.40 While the 
"Senate Committee on the Judiciary reported a substitute version 
of the bill," Senate Bill 507, the full Senate took no action.41 
These bills varied greatly due to amendments adopted during floor 
consideration of House Bill 400.42 The Senate bill amended the 
current reexamination proceeding to eliminate some of the 
disincentives of using reexamination instead of resorting to district 
court litigation to determine validity.43 The .House version 
subsequently deleted this entire provision.44 
Not to be discouraged, reexamination reform was introduced 
yet again in 1999; the 1 06th Congress enacted the first successful 
reform legislation concerning reexamination since the proceedings 
36 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Adamo, Reexamination-To What Avail? An Overview, 63 J. 
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 616,617 (1981). 
37 See Janis, supra note 15, at 40-41. 
38 See id. at 4 n.3. 
39 SeeH.R.REP.No. 106-287,pt.l,at31 (1999). 
40 See id. 
41 !d. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. at 32. 
44 See id. 
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were inaugurated almost two decades ago.45 The House of 
Representatives passed the AIPA in August 1999.46 Though the 
passage of this bill was only the first step in the realization of 
patent reform, the fact that the strongest proponents of patent 
reform were able to gain the support of some of their most vocal 
opponents implied that this bill had a more optimistic future than 
the failed patent legislation noted above.47 AlP A's stated purpose 
is to "provide enhanced protection for inventors and innovators, 
protect patent terms, [and] reduce patent litigation .... "48 With 
unusual speed, the Senate picked up the patent reform ball and ran 
with it. On November 17, 1999, Senate Bill 1948, which 
contained the essential provisions of House Bill 1907, was 
introduced in the Senate.49 On November 19, 1999, the provisions 
of Senate Bill 1948 were incorporated by reference into House Bill 
3194, an omnibus spending bill subsequently passed by both the 
House and the Senate.50 On November 22, 1999, this bill was sent 
to President William Clinton,51 who signed the measure into law 
on November 29, 1999.52 
45 See H.R. 1907, 1 06th Con g. (1999). The bill was finally enacted as part of House 
Bill 3194, 106th Cong. (1999), incorporating by reference Senate Bill1948, 106th Cong. 
(1999). 
46 See id. 
47 Representative Dana Rohrbacher (R-Calif.) was initially one of the most outspoken 
detractors of patent reform, fearing that it did not sufficiently protect the small inventor. 
See Victoria Slind-Flor, Long-fought Patent Changes Arrive, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 20, 1999, 
at B15. After compromises occurred at a meeting sponsored by the PTO, however, 
Rohrbacher became a co-sponsor of the bill in the House. See id. 
48 American Inventors Protection Act, H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. (1999) (emphasis 
added). Title I, as initially introduced in the House, protected inventors from 
unscrupulous inventor promotion services. See id. Title II provided a new defense 
against patent infringement for earlier inventors who did not patent their discovery. See 
id. Title Ill guaranteed a reasonable patent term by granting extensions for delays within 
the PTO. See id. Title IV harmonized the U.S. patent application system with other 
bodies of patent law by providing for pre-issue publication. See id. Title V altered the 
reexamination procedures. See id. 
49 See Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, S. 
1948, 106th Cong. (1999) (enacted). 
50 See Steven Moore & James Jakobsen, The Rules Change Again: The American 
Inventors Protection Act of 1999, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, June 2000, at 49 n.4.; see also 
H.R. 3I95, 106th Cong. (1999). 
51 Cf 106 BILL TRACKING H.R. 3194 ( 1999) ("Became Public Law ... 11/22/99. "). 
52 See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 
(1999). 
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II. Ex PARTE AND INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION 
A. The Original Reexamination Provisions 
Before December 1999, sections 301 through 307 of the Patent 
Act governed all reexamination proceedings. Now called ex parte 
reexamination procedures,53 these still-valid provisions allow 
"[a]ny person at any time,"54 to request a reexamination by filing a 
written request in the PT0.55 The written request must cite 
appropriate prior art and state how this art pertains to the claims 
under reexamination. 56 Appropriate prior art includes only patents 
and other printed publications. 57 
Within three months of the filing of a request, the Director of 
Patents and Trademarks must determine if the filing raises a 
"substantial new question of patentability."58 The Federal Circuit 
attempted to clarify this ambiguous standard, determining that a 
question successfully traversed59 or one or more previously 
considered references60 cannot form the basis for a substantial new 
53 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (2002). 
54 35 U.S.C. § 301. Even though the language allows for a reexamination request at 
"any" time, this has been construed to be limited to the enforceable life of the patent, or 
the duration of the patent term plus six years. See MPEP, supra note 29, § 2211. 
55 See 35 U.S.C. § 302. The commissioner may also commence a reexamination on his 
or her own initiative although this rarely occurs. See Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 
C.F.R. § 1.520 (2003); MPEP, supra note 29, §§ 2212, 2239. In the first eight years that 
the reexamination proceedings were in effect, the commissioner initiated less than one 
percent of reexaminations. See Standard Havens Prods. v. Gencor Indus., 897 F.2d 511, 
514 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
In addition to the threshold requirement of a substantial new question of 
patentability, there must also be "compelling reasons" for the commissioner to order a 
reexamination, such as concern about a patent in a substantial area of industry. See Dugie 
Standeford, PTO Orders Reexamination of Y2K Fix Patent, LEGAL lNTELLIGENCER, Jan. 
7, 2000, at 4. Most recently, former commissioner Q. Todd Dickinson ordered a 
reexamination of a computer software patent claiming a method of fixing Y2K glitches 
after more than 700 cease-and-desist letters were sent by a patent holder to members of 
the software industry. See id. 
56 See 37 C.F.R. § l.510(b)(2). 
57 See 35 U.S.C. § 301; In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en bane); 37 
C.F.R. § l.510(a) (2002). 
58 See 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2000). 
59 See In re Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
60 See In re Portola Packaging Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 791 (Fed. Cir. 1997). During the 
initial examination of the patent in this case, the examiner raised the issue of anticipation 
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question of patentability. Congress, however, has recently 
amended the standard such that a substantial new question may in 
fact be raised based on previously considered art. 61 
Though the standard for a substantial new question might be in 
flux, it is clear that only patents and printed publications may be 
cited in requesting a reexamination.62 As a result, written requests 
may only raise patentability questions based on anticipation and 
obviousness. They may not raise any question requiring proof 
other than a patent or printed publication, such as prior use, 
eligible subject matter, on-sale bar, adequate disclosure, or 
inequitable conduct.63 By limiting the evidence in a reexamination 
request to patents and other publications, Congress attempted to 
provide an inexpensive and quick method for challenging patent 
validity.64 
If a new question of patentability is found, reexamination 
proceeds and the patent owner has a reasonable time to respond.65 
If the patent owner does respond, the party requesting the 
reexamination will then have the opportunity to reply to the 
by the Hunter patent and obviousness in light of the Faulstich patent combined with two 
other references. See id. at 787. The applicant successfully traversed these rejections, and 
the patent subsequently issued. See id. During reexamination, the examiner rejected 
claims as obvious based on the combination of Hunter and Faulstich. See id. The Federal 
Circuit determined that combining previously-considered references in a manner not 
considered during initial examination did not constitute a substantial new question of 
patentability. See id. at 791. 
61 See H.R. 2215, 107th Cong. (2001) (amending sections 303(a), ex parte 
reexamination, and 312(a), inter partes reexamination, of title 35 to include "[t]he 
existence of a substantial new question of patentability is not precluded by the fact that a 
patent or printed publication was previously cited by or to the [PTO] or considered by the 
[PTO]"). 
62 A bill in the 107th Congress did attempt to expand the scope of inter partes 
examination to permit introduction of "undocumented" prior art. See Patent 
Reexamination Enhancement Act of 200 I, H.R. 2231, 1 07th Cong. (200 I); infra Part 
II.B. This bill died in the House. 
63 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.552(c) (2002); MPEP, supra note 29, §§ 2216, 2258. 
64 See Quad Envtl. Tech. Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 875 n.7 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991); H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., at 4 (1980). 
65 See 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2002). The reasonable period for response shall not be less 
than two months. See id. A response from the patent owner may include a statement as 
well as proposed amendments and new claims. See id. The patent owner, however, may 
not broaden the scope of the claims or add new matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2003); 
Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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statement filed by the patent owner.66 If the patent owner does not 
respond, a requester has no further right to participate in the action 
beyond the filing of a request. 
After the time for response and reply has expired, the patent is 
examined in the same manner as initial examination of 
applications.67 Claims subject to reexamination do not maintain 
the presumption of validity conferred on issued patents.68 As they 
are in initial examination, the claims are given the broadest reading 
supported by the specification.69 Because of these factors, the 
examiner is not bound by the "clear and convincing" evidence 
standard that applies in civil litigation when patent validity is 
challenged.70 Reexamination proceeds in the same manner as 
examination-as an ex parte proceeding; thus, a third party 
requesting reexamination is not permitted to participate, although 
the requester is provided with copies of "Office actions" and 
responses throughout the reexamination proceedings. 71 
A patent owner may appeal adverse decisions that arise during 
reexamination through administrative and judicial avenues. 72 In 
addition to being prohibited from participating in the 
reexamination, a third-party requester cannot appeal the denial of a 
reexamination request nor can he or she seek review of the 
examiner's decision upon reexamination. 73 
66 See 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2003). The requester shall also have two months in which to 
reply. See id. 
67 See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2000). 
68 See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en bane). Because 
reexamination functions to provide a mechanism for invalidating wrongfully issued 
patents, it would be contrary to this purpose to presume validity. See id. at 857. Further, 
reexamination should be viewed as distinct from litigation. See id. 
69 See id. at 858. 
70 See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that the 
preponderance of the evidence is the standard during reexamination). 
71 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(g)(2002). 
72 See 35 U.S.C. § 306 (2000). The owner may appeal an examiner's decision to the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI"). See 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2003). From 
the BPAI, the patent owner may appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or 
may file a civil action in the District Court for the District of Columbia. See 25 U.S.C. 
§ 141 (2003). 
73 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 303(c), 306 (2002). The third-party requester may seek 
reconsideration from the Commissioner upon denial of a reexamination request. See 37 
C.F.R. § 1.515(c) (2002). 
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B. Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings 
The AlP A created an alternative reexamination mechanism, 
grafted onto the existing law while leaving the original 
reexamination procedure in place.74 Chapter 31 of the act, which 
forms the basis for the alternative mechanism, provides that "[a ]ny 
third-party requester at any time may file a request for inter partes 
reexamination" by following the procedures and limitations of 
§ 301/5 including being limited to prior-art objections based on 
patents or printed publications. 76 
With respect to the actual filing of a request for reexamination, 
the only difference between ex parte reexamination and inter partes 
reexamination is that, in inter partes reexamination, the real party 
in interest must be identified. 77 An ex parte reexamination request, 
on the other hand, may be filed in the name of "any person," 
including "attorneys representing a principal whose identity is not 
disclosed to the PTO. "78 In both inter partes and ex parte 
reexamination, following a request, the director makes a 
determination whether a "substantial new question of 
patentability" has been raised. 79 If a substantial new question is 
found, inter partes reexamination proceedings are conducted much 
the same as ex parte reexamination, and the proceedings comport 
with initial examination under 35 U.S.C. §§ 132-33, except for the 
allowance of participation by the third-party requester. 80 
By utilizing the inter partes reexamination proceedings, the 
third-party requester obtains "one opportunity to file written 
comments addressing issues raised by the action of the Office or 
the patent owner's response thereto," so long as filed in a timely 
74 For details regarding ex parte reexamination, see supra Part II.A. 
75 See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2003). 
76 See 35 U.S.C. § 301. For a further description of§ 301 and the other ex parte 
reexamination procedures, see supra Part II.A. 
77 See 35 U.S.C. § 311. 
78 Syntex Inc. v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, 882 F.2d 1570, 1573 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989). 
79 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 303, 312. 
80 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 313-14 (2002). One such similarity to ex parte reexamination is 
the prohibition on the patent owner from making amendments that effectively enlarge the 
scope of the claim. See id. § 314. In particular, § 132 provides for reexamination. 
230 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:217 
manner.
81 Also, the inter partes reexamination proceedings 
promote the ability of the third-party requester to appeal, providing 
appeal from an unfavorable decision in reexamination to the Board 
of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 82 As originally enacted, inter 
partes reexamination limited the third-party requester's appellate 
avenues, even while providing greater appeal rights than for ex 
parte reexamination. Congress has recently remedied this 
shortcoming by providing the same appellate avenues to both the 
patentee and the third-party requester in an inter partes 
reexamination, applicable to any reexamination requests filed on or 
after November 29, 2002.83 
The increase in opportunities for participation by the third-
party requester, however, comes at a price. A third-party requester 
is estopped from later questioning in litigation the validity of any 
claim deemed valid during reexamination if the grounds for the 
invalidity challenge were raised or could have been raised during 
the reexamination proceedings.84 More threatening, however, is 
the provision wherein a third-party requester is also estopped from 
challenging any finding of fact made during the reexamination 
proceedings, unless the fact is later proven erroneous based on 
evidence that was unavailable at the time ofreexamination.85 
Ill. THE DIAGNOSIS 
The reexamination system, even as modified by the addition of 
inter partes reexamination and subsequent refinements, does not 
accomplish the lofty goal, as intended by its authors and 
supporters, of providing greater confidence in patent validity, nor 
does it realize the later-voiced goal of reducing patent litigation. 
81 35 u.s.c. § 314. 
82 See id. 
83 See35U.S.C.§315. 
84 See id. The third-party requester is not prevented from asserting invalidity based on 
newly discovered prior art that was not available to the requester or the PTO at the time 
of the reexamination. See id. 
85 See S. 1948, I 06th Cong. § 4607 (1999). This section has not yet been codified. In 
fact, Congress was unsure of the validity of this section when the law was passed and 
added a statement of severability at the end of this provision to ensure the continued 
validity of the remainder of the legislation. See id. 
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Coupled with the failure of the reexamination system itself, patent 
invalidity is again becoming a great concern as the knowledge, 
which serves as prior art, is increasingly decentralized. 86 
Technology is growing and changing rapidly, further diminishing 
the probability that the PTO can maintain a solid grasp on all areas 
of art. Patents are thus being granted that should have been 
rejected, and confidence in the patent system is suffering.87 
Reexamination, in large part due to its failings, is not used as 
frequently as Congress had expected.88 Because it is not often 
used, reexamination also does not fulfill the goal of reducing 
patent litigation. Third parties are much more likely to wait for 
litigation than to run back to the PT0.89 Litigation, however, is not 
an efficient way to deal with patent validity, due to cost in dollars 
and time, and the lack of scientific and technical expertise of 
federal judges.90 Additionally, in this age of global economy, the 
litigation scenario makes obtaining a U.S. patent less desirable to 
foreign patentees, as foreign patentees may be unfamiliar with the 
U.S. justice system or may be wary of actual or imagined bias 
against foreigners. 
86 Cf In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 789 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting 
Congress' recognition that "holdings of patent invalidity by courts were mostly based on 
prior art that was not before the PTO"). 
87 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (issued Aug. 22, 1995) (disclosing "[a] method 
for inducing cats to exercise consist[ing] of directing a beam of invisible light produced 
by a hand-held laser apparatus onto the floor or wall or other opaque surface in the 
vicinity of the cat, then moving the laser so as to cause the bright pattern of light to move 
in an irregular way fascinating to cats, and to any other animal with a chase instinct"); 
U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596 (issued Dec. 21, 1999) (claiming a crustless peanut butter and 
jelly sandwich). 
88 See Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation of U.S. 
Patents: A Proposition for Opposition-And Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 100-0 I (1998). Congress expected more than 2,000 reexaminations 
per year, but only a small fraction of that number is actuallyrequested each year. See id. 
at 101. The number of reexaminations requested has risen from an average of 230 per 
year, based on a study conducted in 1992, to approximately 350 per year more recently. 
See id. at 101 n.184. The number of reexaminations increased from 251 in 1989 to 392 in 
1992. See 1992 COMM'R OF PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS ANNUAL REPORT 30, 59. 
89 See Soobert, supra note 88, at 102. 
90 See Bauz, supra note 24, at 945. 
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A. The Disease of the Ex Parte Reexamination Provisions 
Most critics of the reexamination provisions, many writing 
prior to the passage of the new inter partes reexamination system, 
agree on the main weaknesses of the system as it existed prior to 
December 1999. Inadequate third-party participation mechanisms, 
overly narrow substantive grounds upon which to base a request 
for reexamination, lack of meaningful legal effect especially in the 
case of concurrent litigation, and biased procedural mechanisms 
have all been cited as contributing to the weakened state of 
reexamination.91 Commentators on the inter partes reexamination 
proceedings are no less critical, in large part because inter partes 
reexamination merely appends an equally faulty provision on top 
of the ex parte provisions, which introduced problems of its own 
and relieves only one of the problems associated with ex parte 
reexamination at best. 92 
1. Inadequate Third-Party Participation 
Lack of third-party participation has been the most criticized 
aspect of the ex parte reexamination procedure, and incidentally, 
the only one addressed by the reforms in the AIPA.93 In ex parte 
reexamination, a third-party requester has, at most, two 
opportunities to participate. One opportunity is the ability to file a 
request for reexamination.94 If the patent owner files a reply, the 
requester may then file a response to the patent owner's 
submission.95 Patent owners therefore often forego this reply, 
leaving the third-party requester with no participation beyond the 
91 See, e.g., id. at 953-54, 960-61. Among factors commentators frequently listed as 
weakening the reexamination procedure is the loss of the presumption of validity. See, 
e.g., id. at 955. The author, however, instead agrees with the court in In re Etter, 756 
F.2d 852, 858 (Fed. Cir. 1985), which explained that to permit this presumption would be 
contrary to the purpose of reexamination. 
92 See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Inter Partes Patent Reexamination, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 481, 483 (2000) (stating that in creating inter partes 
reexamination, Congress "has enacted a mongrel procedure that is incoherent in its vision 
and unbalanced in its incentives structure"). 
93 See Janis, supra note 15, at 69-70. 
94 See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). 
95 See 35 U.S.C. § 304 (2003). 
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original request.96 Further, a patent owner may effectively 
preempt even this minimal participation by filing a reexamination 
request of his or her own.97 
The third-party requester may not have any filings beyond 
those considered by the PTO, nor may he or she participate in 
interviews with the examiner.98 More importantly, the third-party 
requester has no opportunity to appeal an unfavorable 
determination, either at the threshold level of determining the 
existence of a substantial new question or of the results from an 
ensuing reexamination. 99 
While reexamination was intended to be a curative mechanism 
to fix a problem that occurred during an initial ex parte 
examination, it is frustrating for the third-party requester to be 
unable to participate. Litigation, on the other hand, offers the third 
party a chance to participate at every level of the invalidity 
determination, where he or she is able to counter every argument 
made by the patentee in support of patent validity. Further, 
litigation provides the third-party requester with an appellate 
process equal to that of the patentee. While the negative aspects of 
litigation include high costs in dollars and time spent, partial 
control over the process and an opportunity to appeal often 
outweigh the downside oflitigation costs. 
2. Narrow Substantive Grounds 
Another oft-voiced concern is that the grounds for which a 
reexamination can be requested are too narrow for widespread use, 
thus encouraging parties to pursue all possible grounds for 
invalidation in court. 100 The statute only permits reexamination for 
questions of novelty and nonobviousness in light of new prior 
art. 101 While it is true that the decentralization of prior art is one 
aggravating factor calling for reexamination, it is also true that a 
96 See Janis, supra note 15, at 71 n.313. 
97 See id. at 70. 
98 See id. at 71. 
99 See id. at 71-72. 
100 See, e.g., Janis, supra note 15, at 53-54 (stating that the scope of reexamination is 
limited to prior art patents or printed publications); Bauz, supra note 24, at 953. 
101 See id. 
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number of patents would have been invalidated had the PTO had 
access to information other than "documented" prior art. 102 
In the secrecy that had traditionally surrounded the patent 
prosecution process, persons having information relevant to on-
sale or prior use activities have not realized the importance of this 
data until after the patent issues. Because of the prior art 
requirement, areas that cannot be challenged include questions of 
utility, on-sale bars, adequate disclosure, 103 inventorship, public 
use, and inequitable conduct. 104 Justifications for this limitation 
include protecting the patent owner from undue procedural 
nightmares, as well as conserving scarce PTO resources. 105 
Though in effect, this limitation creates a reexamination 
proceeding that is "biased against the goal of providing a litigation 
alternative," as there are a number of potentially invalid patents 
that can now only be corrected through litigation. 106 Further, this 
limitation only scratches the surface as a curative mechanism to 
prevent the exploitation of invalid patents. 
3. Lack of Meaningful Legal Effect 
There are two components to this issue: first, unless the patent 
is altered or invalidated during reexamination, there is "no binding 
legal effect"; 107 second, litigation and reexamination may take 
place concurrently. Parties also favor litigation because of these 
102 See Janis, supra note 15, at 58 (citing In re Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394 
(Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
103 The term "adequate disclosure" pertains generally to the requirements imposed by 35 
u.s.c. § 112. 
104 To include inequitable conduct in the list of grounds that are not permitted in 
reexamination may be slightly misleading, as it can not be considered during primary 
examination. To be able to raise this ground for invalidationlunenforceability in a non-
litigation proceeding, however, would provide an additional incentive to use 
reexamination. 
105 See Janis, supra note 15, at 55-56. 
106 See id. at 55 ("Not surprisingly, the stark discontinuity between the substantive scope 
of reexamination and the substantive scope of validity litigation dissuades third parties 
from choosing reexamination over litigation, or precludes them from doing so altogether 
depending upon the nature of their invalidity evidence." (citations omitted)). 
107 See Bauz, supra note 24, at 954. 
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concerns. In litigation, a decision will be final and the res judicata 
and issue preclusion standards are well known and understood. 108 
While it is clear that a court's determination of patent invalidity 
is binding on the PT0, 109 the binding effects of the PTO's 
conclusions during reexamination are less clear. The statute seems 
to clarify that the PTO may cancel any claim deemed unpatentable, 
which is a decision that becomes final upon exhaustion of 
appeals. 110 The lack of clarity involves determinations of validity 
by a court or by the PTO. Litigation, offering a standard basis of 
res judicata and issue preclusion, often appears a more attractive 
alternative. 
A related concern is the possibility of a concurrent litigation 
and reexamination proceeding. Throughout the legislative history 
of reexamination, a number of proposals have been raised to 
prevent this occurrence. 111 Congress, however, has chosen to 
remain silent on this issue, assuming the courts would use their 
discretionary powers to grant stays. 112 Because of the differing 
evidentiary standards between reexamination and litigation, it is 
even possible to obtain different outcomes. Because a 
reexamination proceeding and a lawsuit may run concurrently and 
there is a lack of binding effect between the two, the possibility of 
excess cost is great. 
4. Biased Procedural Measures 
A number of the procedural measures that make up the 
reexamination statute are biased in such a way to make the parties 
consider litigation as more favorable than reexamination. The 
threshold requirement of a substantial new question of patentability 
was designed, along with the high filing fee, to protect the patentee 
108 Cf id. (stating that "the reexamination proceeding lacks meaningful legal effect like 
res judicata or collateral estoppel"). 
109 See MPEP, supra note 29, § 2286; cf Ethicon, Inc., v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (opining that "if a court finds a patent invalid, and that decision is either 
upheld on appeal or not appealed, the PTO may discontinue its reexamination"). 
110 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 306, 307(a) (2002). 
111 See Janis, supra note 15, at 78-79. Proposals range from requiring that all patent 
validity issues be first taken to the PTO to requiring a stay of whichever was filed later. 
/d. 
112 See id. at 79-80. 
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from unnecessary harassment. 113 In practice, however, the 
reexamination requests are often rubber-stamped by the examiners 
because a substantial new question standard is too vague, and 
examiners believe that it is better to err on the side of over-
inclusion.114 This bias would seem to cut in favor of the third-
party requester because it is likely that his or her request for a 
reexamination will be granted. In addition, the loss of a 
presumption of validity in reexamination favors the requester. The 
bias of non-participation, however, weighs heavily in favor of the 
patentee. 115 Thus, both parties have significant reasons to favor 
litigation. In litigation, the only bias is the presumption of patent 
validity, which is often a presumption that is not given much 
weight by judges and juries. 
B. The False Panacea 
In addition to the specter of patent invalidity that Congress 
originally sought to cure by implementing reexamination, one 
specified goal of the new legislation is also to "reduce patent 
litigation."116 Reduction in patent litigation is a stated purpose of 
the amendments to reexamination, with the law aimed at making 
reexamination a more attractive means for challenging patent 
validity than legal action. But even if the addition of inter partes 
reexamination in some way cures a deficiency of ex parte 
reexamination by permitting third-party participation, it is certainly 
not the cure-all that is needed. Further, it is highly questionable 
that this legislation will be able to abate any of the symptoms. 
First, the new legislation carries forward many of the negative 
aspects of the existing ex parte reexamination into the inter partes 
procedures. Second, the requirement that a real party in interest 
must be identified for inter partes reexamination is a disincentive 
for smaller parties to utilize this mechanism. Third, there exists 
some ambiguity in the legislation as to the level of participation of 
the third-party requester, including the right to submit newly-
discovered art during the reexamination proceedings and the right 
113 See id. at 45. 
114 See id. at 48. 
115 See Soobert, supra note 88, at 101-02. 
116 H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. (1999). 
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to participate in interviews with the examiner. Finally, the cost 
incurred by the estoppel provisions is likely to be high enough to 
discourage all but the bravest from using the provision. 
1. Carry-Overs from Ex Parte Reexamination 
The inter partes reexamination procedure, while addressing (at 
least in part) the lack of third-party participation and the lack of 
meaningful legal effect, retains the same overly-narrow bases on 
which to support a request for reexamination that were previously 
present. The lack of meaningful judicial effect has also been 
partially addressed. By introducing legal and factual estoppel in a 
situation where the third-party requester has somewhat limited 
participation, however, does not improve the problem. In fact, it is 
quite possible that a third-party requester will now run into court 
rather than take any unnecessary chances with the PT0. 117 
2. Identification of the Real Party in Interest 
The inter partes reexamination procedure, unlike the ex parte 
provisions, requires that the real party in interest must be 
identified. 118 This is an area of concern for small companies who 
previously had used reexamination as an alternative to litigation. 119 
By filing a reexamination request under the name of a lawyer, a 
small company can raise issues of patent validity without fear of 
being run into court on infringement allegations by bigger 
companies who are more economically able to bear the costs of 
litigation. 120 The retention of ex parte reexamination proceedings 
still allows the small company to air its concerns in the same 
manner; however, the requester does not get the benefit of being 
able to participate. 
117 See infra Part III.B.4. 
118 See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2002). 
119 Cf Janis, supra note 92, at 489 n.32 ("One can imagine, for example, a small 
company that fears an infringement suit from a large patent owner, and would like to test 
the patent in a relatively inexpensive reexamination forum without attracting attention to 
the possible infringement."). 
120 See id. 
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3. Ambiguous Level ofParticipation by Third Party 
While the inter partes reexamination proceedings make clear 
that the third-party requester may submit a filing in response to any 
action by the PTO or the patentee, the law provides no clarity 
about other activities. Some specific questions, left up to the PTO, 
include whether a third party may participate in interviews with the 
examiner (or further, whether the third party must be invited to 
participate) and whether the third-party requester may raise further 
questions of patentability once the reexamination proceedings have 
started. 121 
With respect to the extent of third-party participation, the PTO, 
in the background to the Rules to Implement Optional Inter Partes 
Reexamination Proceedings ("Rules"), specifically states that 
participation of a third party will be limited to "minimize the costs 
and other effects of reexamination requests on patentees."122 The 
third-party requester may file one response for each response of the 
patent owner, limited to issues raised in the Office action or the 
patent owner's response. 123 Rather than dealing with the complex 
issues that would surround interviews, the Rules completely 
prohibit interviews in inter partes reexamination. 124 
With respect to additional questions of patentability, the Rules 
permit citations to prior art by the patent owner or the third-party 
requester to be entered in the examination file. 125 This prior art is 
limited to prior art that is "necessary to rebut a finding of fact by 
[an] examiner" or "rebut a response of the patent owner," or which 
becomes available or known for the first time to the third-party 
requester after the filing of the reexamination request. 126 Citations 
121 Cf Soobert, supra note 88, at Ill (suggesting a new procedure that weighs, among 
other considerations, whether and how much third parties should be permitted to 
participate and whether third parties should be able to appeal). 
122 Rules to Implement Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed. Reg. 
76,756, 76,756 (Dec. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Rules]. 
123 See id. at 76,780 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.947). 
124 See id. at 76,781 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.955). 
125 See id. at 76,778 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.902). 
126 Jd. at 76,780 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.948). 
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by other parties may not be entered until the inter partes 
reexamination is terminated. 127 
4. Estoppel Provisions 
The highest cost exacted by the inter partes reexamination 
procedure comes from the estoppel rules. 128 The third-party 
requester may not question the validity of any claim deemed valid 
during the reexamination in later litigation if the challenge of 
invalidity was raised or could have been raised during the 
reexamination proceedings. 129 Further, the third-party requester 
may not challenge any finding of fact made during the 
reexamination proceedings unless that fact is later proven to be 
false based on evidence unavailable at the time of the 
reexamination. 130 This estoppel, combined with limited avenues of 
appeal, is a great enough detriment to force third parties to use 
either the flawed ex parte reexamination, or more likely, to go into 
court. 
IV. COMPARATIVEANALYSIS 
Both the European Patent Office and the Japanese Patent 
Office engage in post-grant opposition procedures, whereby third 
parties have the opportunity to come forward and challenge the 
validity of recently issued patents. Further, Europe and Japan also 
offer other methods by which to raise issues of invalidity. 
A. European Opposition 
The European Patent Convention ("EPC") governs a 
centralized system for granting a single patent effective in various 
127 See id. at 76,778 (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.902). 
128 It should also be noted that the monetary cost of inter partes reexamination is also 
much greater than ex parte reexamination. The estimated average cost of an inter partes 
reexamination is $8,800, compared to $2,520 for ex parte reexamination. See id. at 
76,757. This cost, however, is de minimis when compared to the costs involved in 
litigation. Note that the costs listed here are just the filing fees for reexamination. See 37 
C.F.R. § 1.20 (2002). 
129 See 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2003). 
130 SeeS. 1948, I 06th Cong. § 4607 (1999). This section has not yet been codified. 
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European states. 131 Opposition against a European patent must be 
initiated within nine months of publication of the grant of a patent 
in the European Patent Bulletin. 132 Any person, exclusive of the 
patent owner, is entitled to file a notice of opposition. 133 The 
notice of opposition must include a statement concerning the 
grounds on which the opposition is based as well as an indication 
of the facts, evidence, and arguments presented in support of these 
grounds. 134 Admissible grounds for opposition include lack of 
novelty, lack of inventive step, lack of industrial application, 
ineligible subject matter, non-patentability, inadequate disclosure, 
and inadmissible amendment. 135 
The opposition proceedings are conducted by the European 
Patent Office ("EPO") Opposition Division consisting of three 
examiners, two of whom did not .,participate in the initial 
examination. 136 The notice of opposition is sent to the patent 
owner, who may reply with observations or amendments. 137 After 
this optional reply, the Opposition Division examines the patent, 
basing its decision on the arguments set forth in the notice of 
opposition as well as evidence taken during the proceedings. 138 
Evidence includes written documents, not limited to printed prior 
art and patents, and also may include the oral testimony of parties, 
witnesses, and experts. 139 
The opposition proceedings will result in either the revocation 
of the patent or the maintenance of a patent. 140 Either the patent 
131 See European Patent Convention, Oct. 5 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270 [hereinafter EPC], 
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 675 (Marshall A. 
Leaffer ed., 2d ed. 1997). 
132 See EPC, supra note 131, art. 99(1). 
133 See id An applicant was previously able to file an opposition against his own patent. 
See Case G 01184, Mobil OiVOpposition by Proprietor, E.P.O. 10/1985, 299. This 
position has now been reversed, and an applicant may not oppose his own patent. See 
Case G 09/93, Peugeot & Citroen/Opposition by Patent Proprietor, E.P.O. 12/1994, 891. 
134 Cf EPC, supra note 131, art. 99(1) (stating that a "written reasoned statement" must 
be filed). 
135 See id arts. 52-57, 100. 
136 See id art. 19. 
137 See id. art. 100, rule 57a. 
138 See id art. 1 0 1. 
139 See id 
140 See id art. 102. The patent may be maintained in unamended or amended form. See 
id 
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owner or the requester of the opposition may appeal on factual or 
legal grounds any adverse decision by the Opposition Division to 
the EPO Board of Appeal. 141 
Oppositions, while not used extensively, are prevalent enough 
to allow those who participate to become proficient. Furthermore, 
the fact that the opposition proceedings are used is some proof of 
their believed value. In 2000, the number of patent examinations 
requested of the EPO was 45,864. 142 Of this number, 27,523 
patents were granted. 143 Just over seven percent of this number 
(i.e., 1,998 patents) were opposed in that same time period. 144 
B. Other European Methods to Challenge Validity 
In many European countries, third parties may also challenge 
the validity of an EPO patent through a method such as national 
revocation proceedings. 145 These decisions are only effective in 
the particular contracting state where the proceedings occurred. 
C. Japanese Oppositions 
The Japanese Patent Office ("JPO") consists of examiners, 
charged with determining the patentability of an application, as 
well as trial examiners, who hear various trials within the JP0. 146 
Because the Japanese courts have no jurisdiction regarding the 
validity of patents, the trial examiners hear issues of validity after 
issuance in addition to issues regarding an examiner's 
determination of unpatentability. 147 
Any person may file an opposition to a Japanese patent within 
six months after the publication of the issued patent. 148 The 
141 See id. art. 106. 
142 See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, FACTS AND FIGURES 2000, at 16 (2001), available at 
http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/facts_figures/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2003). 
143 See id. 
144 See id. 
145 See Soobert, supra note 88, at 151 n.444. 
146 See Patent Law, Law No. 121 of 1959, §§ 47, 137(1), as amended (Jap.), translated 
in JAPANESE LAWS RELATING TO INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (Japanese Patent Office trans., 
1996) [hereinafter Japanese Patent Law]. 
147 See id. §§ 121, 123. 
148 See Soobert, supra note 88, at 165 (citing Japanese Patent Law§ 113). 
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written opposition must include a statement of the grounds for 
opposition as well as supporting evidence. 149 A Japanese patent 
may be opposed on nearly any ground for which an examiner may 
determine an application to be unpatentable. 150 Opposition may be 
based on evidence of activities, as well as printed prior art 
material. 151 
A chief trial examiner will forward the notice of opposition to 
the patentee, who then has a period in which to reply, to amend the 
specification or drawings by narrowing the claims, correcting 
errors or clarifying ambiguity. 152 After the period for reply, a 
group of three trial examiners is convened to examine the 
evidence. 153 Documentary evidence is prevalent, but testimonial 
evidence may be presented upon motion. 154 At the conclusion of 
the evidence, the trial examiners render an opinion as to the 
opposition. 155 
A decision that is unfavorable to the patentee may be appealed 
to the Tokyo High Court; however, favorable rulings are not 
appealable, and recourse consists of further opposition, if the time 
period has not lapsed, or alternate revocation proceedings. 156 
D. Other Japanese Methods to Challenge Validity 
Japan has a number of alternative avenues with which to 
challenge the validity of a patent. These methods include a "trial 
for invalidation of a patent," which is an inter partes proceeding 
before a group of three trial examiners. 157 Most commonly 
demanded by alleged infringers, the trial for invalidation of a 
patent is based largely on oral testimony. 158 Again, in this 
149 See id. (citing Japanese Patent Law§ 115). 
150 See id. at 163 (citing Japanese Patent Law § 113). Some of these grounds include 
lack of novelty, lack of industrial application, lack of inventive step, improper claims, or 
insufficient disclosure. See id. at 158. 
151 See id. at 163-64. 
152 See id. at 166 (citing Japanese Patent Law§§ 115, 120). 
153 See id. (citing Japanese Patent Law§ 114). 
154 See id. at 166-67 (citing Japanese Patent Law§ 117). 
155 See id. at 167 (citing Japanese Patent Law§ 114). 
156 See id. 
157 See id. at 167 n.530. 
158 See id. 
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proceeding, a patent will be invalidated for largely the same 
reasons that an initial patent may be refused. 159 
Japanese patents may also be amended after issuance if the 
patentee demands a "trial for correction."160 This ex parte 
proceeding is typically conducted before three trial examiners. 161 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Numerous commentators have chimed in on the subject of 
reexamination reform. The many proposed solutions offered by 
the scholars, however, are insufficient to cure the disease that has 
eaten away at the skeleton that supported the inception of the 
reexamination provision. Other suggestions are so far-fetched and 
academic, making the solution a scholarly exercise. Instead, this 
Article submits that a pragmatic approach is the key to actual 
reexamination reform. The scheme must carefully consider the 
goals advanced in justification of this procedure and reflect a 
proceeding that is the result of carefully balancing these goals. 
Further, the scheme must balance the interests of all parties 
involved: the patentee, the competitor, the investor, and the public. 
A. Corrective Surgery: Proposals to Reform Reexamination 
Because of the complexity of issues, the divergent goals, and 
the mess that has been made of the existing reexamination 
provisions, it is unlikely that mere reform is going to be sufficient. 
Like many of the proposed solutions, the AlP A reexamination 
reform provisions simply bandage the problem or at best provide 
corrective surgery. Rather than looking into the problems that 
exist in ex parte reexamination, excising those problems, and 
inserting more effective solutions, Congress merely covered 
existing procedures with new ones. This is simply inadequate. To 
best solve the problems enumerated above, more cutting of the 
existing procedures is required so that the reform provisions fill in 
the gaps rather than just lay on top of a flawed system. 
159 See id. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
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B. Radical Amputation: Proposals to Dispose of Reexamination 
Proceedings 
While it is painfully clear that mere cosmetic changes to the 
current reexamination provisions are insufficient to meet the 
above-enunciated goals, the radical changes proposed by many 
commentators are also ineffective. Based on the great initiative 
required to pass even the smallest legislation, a complete overhaul 
of the patent system is not likely to occur any time soon. Instead, a 
better solution would be to propose a system that addresses all 
concerns, yet still maintains enough familiarity with the current 
system so that detractors will not balk merely because the proposed 
system looks too different. 
One example of a proposed system that looks too different is 
opposition, similar to that used in Europe or Japan. 
Recommendations for the implementation of an opposition system 
in the United States date as far back as 1936. 162 In more recent 
years, the subject of opposition has again been raised by a number 
of respected voices within the field of patent law. Both the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association ("AIPLA") and 
the Intellectual Property Section of the ABA have made public 
resolutions encouraging the creation of an oppositiOn 
proceeding. 163 Opposition proceedings have also been hailed by 
noted professors such as Harold Wegner and Robert Merges. 164 
Finally, there have been empirical studies, the results of which 
show judicial favor for the development of opposition 
proceedings. 165 
162 See Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 
759, 764 n.28 (1999). 
163 See id. 
164 See id. (citing Harold C. Wegner, Patent Law Simplification and the Geneva 
Convention, 14 AIPLA Q.J. 154, 200-01 (1986)); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six 
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent 
System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 610-15 (1999). 
165 One study, conducted by Nard himself, polled federal district court judges. See Nard, 
supra note 162, at 769. Of the 204 respondents, 93 favored the implementation of 
opposition proceedings, 45 opposed, and 66 had no opinion. See id. app. A 1995 study 
by Lawrence G. Kastriner indicated that of the forty-two patent lawyers who responded, 
ninety percent stated they were in favor of the implementation of opposition proceedings. 
See id. at 796 n.172. 
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Among the justifications that Professor Craig Allen Nard cites 
for the implementation of opposition proceedings are ( 1) most 
prior art references asserted during litigation were not considered 
during prosecution before the PTO and (2) the probability of a 
finding of invalidity was greater when the patent was challenged 
with uncited prior art rather than with cited art. 166 These 
justifications, however, fail to explain why reexamination, which 
must be based on uncited prior art, is an underutilized mechanism 
with which to challenge patent validity. 
C. A Realistic Approach to Revamping the System 
As evidenced by the above discussion, it is clear that any 
attempt to reformulate the reexamination procedure must be both 
goal driven and goal defined. Two goals that should be addressed 
in reforming the reexamination system are (1) providing a curative 
mechanism for invalid patents and (2) serving as an attractive 
alternative to litigation of patent validity. Another goal should be 
providing a scheme that equally protects the inventor, the 
competitor, the investor, and the public. Finally, while complete 
harmonization with international systems may not provide the best 
scheme for the United States, the interests of those engaging in the 
global economy must be considered. 
As it was at the enactment of the initial reexamination 
procedure, one important goal is to provide a mechanism for 
effectively challenging the validity of an issued patent. One 
commentator suggests that a curative mechanism may be less 
necessary at this time because the creation of the Federal Circuit 
has brought about an increased adherence to the presumption of 
patent validity. 167 But the need is not gone; the audience has 
simply changed. The audience is no longer the judiciary to be 
convinced of patent validity; instead, the audience is the inventing 
and investing public because patent validity is important for a 
number of economic reasons. This goal of comforting the 
investing public is mentioned in the legislative history of the initial 
166 See id. at 768 (citing a study by John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, published in 
their article Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 
234 ( 1998)). 
167 See Janis, supra note 15, at 26. 
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reexamination mechanism. However, this goal seems to be 
inadequately met by that procedure, has not proven to be the 
subject of much commentary, and requires more scrutiny than it 
has thus far received. 
A second important, and somewhat related, goal is to provide a 
cost-effective method to challenge validity, or in other words, an 
attractive alternative to litigation. This goal, too, was mentioned 
during the enactment of the initial reexamination legislation, but it 
has not been met by the current reexamination scheme. 
Third, the procedure should take into account the balance of 
equities and resources and must address the needs of the inventor, 
the investor, the competitor, and the public. This goal will require 
a fine balance, as the motivations of these groups are often 
divergent, if not wholly contradictory. With respect to 
reexamination, an inventor's interest is largely to enjoy quiet title 
to his or her patent and to avoid undue harassment. A competitor's 
interest, however, lies in the provision of a useful method of 
challenging an invalid, overly broad patent, especially as the 
competitor is likely to have the best information to do so. The 
interest of the investor is having security in the metes and bounds 
of a patent, as well as quiet enjoyment upon assignation. It is in all 
parties' interest to have an expedient proceeding as well as a clear 
understanding of finality. 
Finally, the procedure must either harmonize with international 
intellectual property proceedings, or at least, must not discourage 
participation by inventors also participating in the global economy. 
The trend in international patent law is toward harmonization. Yet 
some aspects of American patent law remain unique. Because 
some of these unique aspects are due to the American way of life, 
such as provisions that protect the garage inventor, it is important 
to consider ways to harmonize that do not disrupt these interests. 
If harmonization is not necessary, then the least that will suffice 
will be to provide a fair playing field for inventors and investors 
from all countries. 
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D. A Proposed Method of Patent Invalidation 
Renaming the mechanism from "reexamination" to "patent 
invalidation" calls attention to the fact that the proceeding is no 
longer a mimicry of the original examination. The functional 
points of the proposed plan include a patent invalidation board, a 
procedure for requesting a patent invalidation, the workings of a 
patent invalidation proceeding, and the legal effects of the patent 
invalidation determination. A number of comments that addressed 
the PTO's proposed rules of 1995 share similar thoughts to a 
number of these proposals. These comments, as well as the PTO 's 
responses, are discussed below. 
1. The Patent Invalidation Board 
Within the PTO, a group of patent attorneys should be hired to 
form the patent invalidation board. The members of the 
invalidation board would have no duties outside of their function 
on the board, which would include granting requests for 
invalidation proceedings and serving as administrative arbiters 
during invalidation proceedings. The creation of this board would 
serve a number of purposes. First, concerns have been raised that 
examiners' limited knowledge of law is insufficient for their 
participation in invalidation if the procedure is to include 
evidentiary support beyond the prior art references familiar to 
examiners. The proposed solution, as detailed below, pairs an 
invalidation board member-a patent lawyer-with an examiner 
so that greater knowledge will be available to the examiner. 
Second, there is concern that examiners, because reexamination 
occurs so infrequently, do not gain sufficient expertise in the 
procedure. Because the invalidation board would be a small group 
and collectively would be involved in all invalidation proceedings, 
this expertise in invalidation can then be shared with the examiner, 
who would bring expertise in patentability and technology to the 
team. Third, this solution would leave the best examiners in the 
examining group, unlike some previous proposals calling for the 
creation of a reexamination board composed of examiners of 
superior skill. 
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One comment submitted in response to rules proposed in 1995 
(in anticipation of reexamination reform that eventually did not 
pass) called for the examiner with the greatest legal and other skills 
given the complexity of the issue to be assigned to inter partes 
reexamination. 168 Two other comments called for a trio of 
examiners and legal specialists to handle reexamination. 169 The 
PTO's response to these comments, when promulgating the 2000 
rules, indicates that a special group, compromised of legal 
advisors, may be created to oversee the reexamination by an 
examiner. 170 As of December 2000, the PTO was still considering 
this option. 171 With respect to the panel of examiners, the PTO is 
considering a panel review of the examiner's reexamination 
determination prior to the issuance of the reexamination 
certificate. 172 
The above-proposed patent invalidation board goes further than 
to create a group of reexamination legal specialists that will 
oversee reexamination. Instead, each reexamination would be 
supervised directly by the examiner or invalidation board member 
team. The patent invalidation board would act in a supervisory 
role, much as the group suggested by the PTO, but would also act 
on a more individual basis and as an administrative arbiter within a 
particular reexamination case. This is required because the patent 
invalidation proceedings as detailed below would likely require 
more legal expertise on a regular basis due to evidentiary and 
estoppel issues. 
2. Requesting a Patent Invalidation Proceeding 
A request for patent invalidation may only be filed in the 
eighteen months following the grant of the patent, unless the 
patentee has brought an infringement suit against a party or has 
168 See Rules to Implement Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed. 
Reg. 18,154, 18,157 (Apr. 6, 2000). Although the 1995 bill does not speak of inter partes 
reexamination, it was the precursor for the current inter partes reexamination, and will be 
addressed as such for ease. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. at 18,158. 
171 See Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,756, 76,758 (Dec. 7, 2000). 
172 See Rules to Implement Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,158. 
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sufficiently created a reasonable fear of an infringement suit that a 
party has filed for declaratory judgment. If a patent infringement 
issue is before a court, either as a result of a patent owner suing for 
infringement or an alleged infringer suing for a determination of 
non-infringement, a request for patent invalidation may be filed at 
any time. Of course, a patent infringement action may only be 
brought in court during the enforceable life of the patent. This 
provision provides the patent owner with a period of quiet 
enjoyment after eighteen months, unless the patent owner chooses 
to open up the courthouse door himself or herself. This further 
prevents filings purely for harassment purposes after eighteen 
months. The inventor or patent owner's interest in quieting 
harassment is balanced against the competitor's interest in being 
able to challenge a possibly invalid patent based on information 
most likely possessed by him or her. 
A patent invalidation proceeding may only be initiated by a 
third party. This modification prevents patent owners from filing a 
request to preempt a request filed by a competitor. The third-party 
requester of the patent invalidation may raise any grounds on 
which a patent may be found invalid or unenforceable, including 
anticipation, obviousness, on-sale bar, public use, inventorship 
problems, inequitable conduct, and inadequate disclosure. The 
grounds must be particularly alleged and accompanied by 
supporting evidence. In the case of anticipation and obviousness, 
supporting evidence shall include the relevant prior art as well as a 
clear statement of the pertinence of the references. For other 
grounds, evidence shall include a clear statement of alleged 
activity as well as brief affidavit testimony in support thereof. This 
represents an important balance between the investor, whose 
interest lies in securing a valuable property interest, and the 
competitor, who should not need to fear suit for infringing an 
invalid or overly broad patent. 
Requests for invalidation would be forwarded to the patent 
invalidation board, which would determine whether a question of 
patentability, or more succinctly, invalidity, exists. The 
determination shall be made within one month. Because this is one 
of only two duties that the board has, the expedient timing is 
feasible. Also, because the determination is made so quickly, this 
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represents one improvement over litigating the matter. If the board 
determines that there is a question that should be explored, then a 
patent invalidation proceeding will begin. If the board determines 
that the filing of the request for patent invalidation was frivolous or 
done in order to harass the patentee, the board may suggest that 
Rule 11 sanctions 173 be considered by the district court where the 
case lies. Further, the patent invalidation board's determination 
that a question of patentability exists and the initiation of patent 
invalidation proceeding would cause an automatic stay of all 
pending litigation involving the patent. While stays are frequently 
requested and granted at this time, this procedural point must be 
codified so that it is universally followed. 
If the patent invalidation board determines that there is no 
reasonable question of invalidity, then the requester may appeal 
this determination to the district court where infringement 
litigation is pending or, if no litigation is pending, to a district court 
with proper jurisdiction and venue. Because the determination of 
an invalidity question is essentially an application of particular 
facts to the law and because the PTO' s level of expertise is high, 
the standard of review should be one of deference similar to that of 
informal agency fact finding. Patent invalidation board 
determinations, then, would be subject to reversal if the court 
determines the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
the board's discretion. 
In the comment period for the 1995 rules, one observation 
suggested that the PTO should include affidavits in the prior art 
analysis. 174 In response, the PTO reiterated the findings of a 1992 
Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, holding that the 
PTO is an inappropriate forum for addressing areas of invalidity 
beyond those based on documentary prior art, largely because of 
the mishaps that occurred during proceedings under the Dann 
amendments. 175 So long as this mindset is maintained, it is 
unlikely that any curative mechanism will ever be able to fulfill the 
173 See FED. R. Crv. P. 11. 
174 See Rules to Implement Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,158. 
175 See id. (citing ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT LAW REFORM, REPORT TO THE 
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 117 (Aug. 1992)). 
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dual goals of increasing patent validity and decreasing patent 
validity litigation. Rather than looking to the Dann amendments as 
a reason to prohibit expanding the reexamination proceedings, it 
would be more instructive to view the Dann amendments as a first 
draft or a teaching tool. Instead of simply avoiding the problem, 
lessons should be learned from the mistakes that ensued. The 
proposed invalidation proceedings outlined in this Article take into 
account the concerns raised by the Dann amendments and build 
from those mistakes. 
3. The Patent Invalidation Proceeding 
Patent invalidation proceedings would be conducted by a team 
composed of a member of the patent invalidation board and the 
examiner who conducted the original examination of the patent. If 
the original examiner is unavailable, a suitable alternative would 
be selected by the PTO, as is currently done for reexaminations. 
Any significant splits of opinion between the examiner and the 
board member would be resolved by the entire patent invalidation 
board. 
For a case involving only prior art, the case would proceed 
with Office actions and responses permitted by both parties. If it is 
determined that an interview would hasten along the process, then 
both the patentee and the requester may attend and participate. 
Any new art that is discovered during the pendency of the patent 
invalidation proceeding must be presented to the examiner. Once a 
third-party requester has initiated an invalidation proceeding, it 
would be unfair to allow the requester to sandbag the patent owner. 
If a third party becomes aware of additional prior art after an 
invalidation proceeding is complete, however, a subsequent 
request for invalidation may be filed on the basis of this art, but the 
request must also be accompanied with a declaration that the party 
was not aware of the art during the previous proceeding and a 
statement of why this information was not available earlier. This 
provision serves to prevent excess harassment of a patent owner 
and promotes the general interest of expedience. 
For cases involving affidavit evidence, the team may make a 
decision on the affidavits-and counter-affidavits-alone, as a 
matter similar to summary judgment. If it is determined that there 
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is a material issue of fact, then the team may permit abbreviated 
discovery in the form of depositions and interrogatories of the 
witnesses covering issues raised during the request. Hearings may 
be permitted by the team, and in any case, a full record should be 
developed. 
Decisions of the patent invalidation team may be appealed by 
either the patentee or the requester to the Board of Patent 
Interferences and Appeals ("BP AI"), which would make a 
determination based upon the record developed. Decisions of the 
BP AI may be appealed back to the district court where litigation 
was stayed, or if no litigation is pending, to a district court with 
appropriate jurisdiction and venue. The district court may handle 
the appeal by reviewing the record for error, by hearing oral 
arguments, or by reopening the issue to receive further evidence or 
testimony. Because the record has been created in full, it would be 
sufficient to make that determination on the record unless an error 
has been made by the invalidation team in not hearing evidence. 
The PTO has already addressed the issue of creating a full 
record for the purpose of appeal. With respect to inter partes 
reexamination, the PTO will "direct the examiner to make a 
complete record of the reasons for allowing or rejecting a claim at 
various stages."176 This policy needs to be strengthened in the case 
of patent invalidation proceedings and needs to include all 
documentary and testimony evidence that the examiner took into 
account in reaching a decision in order for the process to function 
smoothly at the appellate level. 
4. Legal Effects of Patent Invalidation Proceedings 
A patent, or any part therein, found invalid during patent 
invalidation proceedings is to be treated by all courts as invalid 
after the exhaustion of possible appeals. Any patent found valid 
during patent invalidation proceedings shall be held as valid in the 
district court where the infringement case is held. Further, a patent 
found valid may not be challenged on the same bases by any other 
parties in the absence of different evidence. 
176 See Rules to Implement Optional Inter Partes Reexamination Proceedings, 65 Fed. 
Reg. at 18,158. 
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The final determination of invalidity based on a patent 
invalidation proceeding provides a level of certainty to all players 
involved without denying the patentee any rights he or she already 
has. If the invention had been found to be unpatentable during the 
initial examination period, he or she would be denied a patent after 
the exhaustion of available avenues of appeal. 177 If in 
reexamination it is found that the patent was granted in error, the 
patentee is not being deprived of what he or she rightfully 
deserves, but rather is being relieved of something he or she 
received in error. In this way, the patent invalidation proceeding 
truly can function as a curative mechanism. Permitting the 
patentee to try his or her luck in a different forum after having 
been denied a patent in the manner a patent is usually obtained, is 
unfair to competitors. 
A determination of validity by the patent invalidation board, 
followed by an exhaustion of avenues of appeal, similarly provides 
the patentee with all of the rights that he or she would have 
received during an original examination proceeding. By 
prohibiting that validity from being challenged in court or in the 
PTO on the same bases by another party, however, the patentee is 
permitted to enjoy the rights that he or she has rightfully obtained. 
Third-party requesters have greater rights in the patent invalidation 
proceeding than in the current reexamination because they have a 
full array of appeal possibilities. Arguably, the only party that has 
diminished rights in light of the proposed patent invalidation 
system is the non-requesting public, as it is not permitted to 
challenge a patent on the same bases that has been previously 
attempted. Though, this does not really injure the public. In the 
case of questions based solely on prior art, someone may not bring 
a request based on prior art that has already been considered in any 
capacity. Therefore, this preclusion does not change. In the case 
of questions based on testimonial evidence, the non-requester 
would be able to come forth in the case of new evidence. Thus, 
while protecting the patentee's enjoyment of his or her patent and 
177 Commentators have discussed whether a procedure of this type would violate the 
patentee's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Most, however, agree that the 
patentee is not entitled to the jury trial, and thus must only get a fair, legal process. See, 
e.g., Janis, supra note 15, at 38-40, 87-92. 
254 FORDHAMINTELL. PROP. MEDIA &ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:217 
preventing harassment, the proposed rules for the patent 
invalidation proceedings do not tie the hands of third-party 
requesters or the general public. 
CONCLUSION 
While the importance of consumer, investor, inventor, and 
court confidence in the validity of patents cannot be overstated, the 
problem of increasingly decentralized knowledge bases, combined 
with rapidly changing technology, has intensified concern about 
the PTO's ability to ensure patent validity. Patent invalidity is 
often challenged in court, in front of judges with little or no 
technical expertise and full dockets. Further, litigation costs are 
skyrocketing. It is in light of these realities that reexamination 
reform must begin. 
Reexamination has proven insufficient to meet its initially 
stated goal of improving confidence in patent validity, largely 
because it simply not being used. A dual goal has also been 
advanced along with reexamination reform-the reduction of 
patent litigation-but that goal is equally unserved by both ex parte 
and inter partes reexamination. While a number of proposals have 
been raised for reforming reexamination, including the inter partes 
reexamination introduced in the AlP A, these proposals either fall 
short or are so radical as to be merely academic. 
Unless the reexamination proceedings are reformed, 
reexamination will continue to be underutilized, with both patent 
holders and accused infringers preferring to take their battles to the 
courthouse. By creating an attractive mechanism with a 
meaningful legal effect, contests regarding validity would be 
decided by a more experienced forum, which would boost patent 
validity confidence. Further, in making the PTO the preliminary 
arbiter of invalidity issues, the goal of reducing patent litigation 
would be facilitated. The time has come to truly heal the 
reexamination procedure so that it can finally withstand the burden 
that it was designed to support. 
